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for a 
:Mansur's 
what part of 
of law, 
's determina-and his 
tion of this issue. (S.D. , 43 F. 
849.) 
affirmed. 
F. Xo. Hl3·12. In Bank. Mar. 22, 1957.] 
Spence, 
v. CijARENOE HERDA, 
[1] Divorce-Permanent of Agreement of Parties. 
-Husband and wife made provisions for support and mainte-
nance an integral part of their settlement agree-
ment where they clearly their purpose to settle 
their rights in all Tespeets as otherwise provided, where 
the wife accepted the for her in full satisfaction 
of her right to the property and of her right to 
support and maintenance of herself and the minor children, 
and where the husband to pay her a designated sum 
per month for such support and maintenance, and the fact 
that the amount of existing 
and the amount that otherwise accrue termina-
tion of the was speculative did not detract from the 
spouses' clearly expressed intention, as between themselves, to 
fix the amount of payments. 
[2] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
It is not significant that the amount on for support 
and maintenance of the wife and minor children in a property 
settlement agreement was the same that the husband had been 
paying the wife following their but before the 
agreement was executed the 
to an amount that could not he during the minority 
of the children or increased unless the welfare of the children 
so required. 
[3] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Termina-
tion.-Where there was no express provision in a property 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217; Am.Jur., 
Divorce and Separation, § 586 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: 2] Divorce, § 203; [3, 4] Divorce, 
§ 214; [5] Divorce, § 216(5); [6] Divorce, § 180(4). 
Mar. HERDA v. HERDA 
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in a 1938 divorce decree that 
~mw>~wr. should termi-
and no express that they 
death, the insignificant amount of the 
Twonrq•tv involved the conclusion that by 
necessary the attributable to the wife's 
support should terminate on her just as those at-
tributable to the support of the children terminate on their 
reaching their majority. 
[ 4] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Termina-
tion.-The conclusion that payments provided for the support 
and maintenance of the wife in a property settlement agree-
ment ineorporated in a divoree deeree should terminate on the 
wife's remarriage, based either on an express provision to that 
effect or inferred from the provisions of the agreement as a 
whole, does not conflict with the conclusion that it is an inte-
grated bargain and that the payments are not otherwise sub-
ject to modification; it would be unreasonable to conclude 
that the payment should continue for the wife's benefit after 
the obligation to support the children had terminated on their 
reaching their majority and the obligation of her support had 
been assumed by her second husband. 
[5] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Hearing 
and Determination of Motion.-An order denying a motion to 
have payments for the support and maintenance of a former 
wife and minor children reduced on the grounds that the wife 
had remarried and that one of the children was about to enter 
the armed services was not res judicata in a subsequent pro-
ceeding to have the payments terminated on the ground that 
the wife had remarried and both children had reached their 
majority where, at the time of the previous modification pro-
ceedings, neither child had reaehed his majority and it could 
not be determined whether denial of the motion was based 
on a determination that the wife's remarriage was immaterial 
or on continuing need of the full amount for the children's 
support, care and education. 
[6] Id.-Counsel Fees.-Where a property settlement agreement 
incorporated in a divorce decree specifically provided that the 
husband should indemnify the wife for all costs and attorney's 
fees in defending any motion or proceeding affecting the agree-
ment, and did not make her right to such fees dependent on 
her inability to pay them, the trial court erred in denying her 
prayer therefor on the ground that she had not shown such 
inability. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County terminating support payments under a divorce 
:2:l0 HERDA v. HERDA [48 C.2<1 
judgment. Murray Draper, ,Judge. Order affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Henry W. Schaldach for .Appellant. 
Chas. E. R. Fulcher for Respondent. 
'riL'\ YNOR, ,I.--Plaintiff and defendant were married in 
J 92;) alHl separated in 1937. On Marrh 1, 1988, they executed 
a property settlement agreement. It recited that owing to 
disputes and differences between them the parties had agreed 
to live separate and apart and that it was their "mutual wish 
and desire ... that a full and final adjustment of all their 
property rights, interests and claims be had, settled and deter-
mined by said parties in this Agreement, including custody 
and maintenam~e of the [two] minor rhildren of said parties.'' 
It provided : 
"Now THERE~'ORE, it is agreed in consideration of the 
mutual promises, agreements, and covenants contained herein, 
it is covenanted, agreed, and promised by each party hereto, 
to and with the other party hereto, as follows: 
''FIRST: 'l'hat, except as hereinafter specified, each party 
hereto is hereby released and absolved from any and all obliga-
tions and liabilities for the future acts and duties of the 
other, and that ear.h of said parties hereby releases the other 
from any and all liabilities, debts or obligations of any kind 
or character inenrrecl by the other from and after this date, 
and from any aud all claims and d(~mands, including all claims 
of either party upon the other for support and maintenance 
as wife or husband or otherwise, it being understood that 
this instrument is intended to settle the rights of the parties 
hereto in all respects, except as hereinafter provided. . . . 
"FIFTH : l Plaintiff] does and shall aecept the provisions 
herein made for her in full satisfaction of her right to the 
community property of the respective parties hereto, and in 
full satisfaction of hrr right to snpport and maintenance, and 
for the support and maintenance of said minor children as 
herein provided.'' 
Provisions were then made for the division of the property. 
Plaintiff received household personal property and defendant 
received an automobile. A life insurance policy on defend-
ant's life 1vas assigned to plaintiff and defendant agreed to 
keep the policy in force. It was further agreed that plaintiff 
should have custody of the minor children and be entitled 
to take them out of the state. 
Mar. 1957] HERDA v. HERDA 
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Paragraph eight provided that "The husband agrees in 
consideration of the premises and mutual covenants and agree-
ments herein contained to pay to the wife the sum of Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month as and for the 
support and maintenance of herself and the minor children 
of said parties, said payments to commence on March 1, 1938 
and to continue monthly thereafter on the first (1st) day of 
each and every month thereafter." It also provided that 
defendant should pay certain debts and plaintiff's moving 
expenses should she decide to leave the state. 
On March 18, 1938, plaintiff filed an action for divorce on 
the grounds of extreme cruelty. She attached a copy of 
the agreement to the complaint and prayed that it he ap-
proved and made a part of the decree by reference. On 
April 18th she secured an interlocutory decree of divorce, 
which approved the agreement and incorporated it in its 
entirety by reference. It also provided that "IT Is FuRTHER 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant be, and he 
hereby is, required to pay to plaintiff herein, as and for her 
support and the support, care and education of the minor 
children of said parties, the sum of Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($250.00) per month, which said payments to com-
mence March 1, 1938, and continue monthly hereafter on 
the 1st day of each and every month." 
A final decree of divorce was entered in 1939, and plaintiff 
remarried in 1943. In 1944 defendant moved to have the 
payments reduced on the grounds that plaintiff had remarried 
and that one of the children was about to enter the armed 
services, but his motion was denied. In 1954 he moved to 
have the payments terminated on the ground that plaintiff 
had remarried and both the children had reached their ma-
jority. Plaintiff moved for attorney's fees to resist defend-
ant's motion, and following a hearing the court ordered that 
the interlocutory and final decrees ''be modified by termi-
nating all payments for the support of the plaintiff and for 
the support, care and education of the minor children of the 
parties hereto forthwith." It also ordered that no counsel 
fees be allowed for plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff appeals. 
She contends that the proYision for monthly payments was 
an integral and inseparable part of the property settlement 
agreement of the parties and that therefore the amount of 
the payments attributable to her cannot be reduced because 
of her remarriage. She also contends that the order denying 
modification in 1944 is res judicata in her favor. Defendant 
232 HERDA v. HERDA [48 C.2d 
contends, for payments 
\Yas a provision for to section 139 of the Civil 
Code and that even if it constitutes an and insep-
arable part of the property settlement his obliga-
tions thereunder terminated after remarried and the 
children reached their majority. He also contends that the 
1944 order is not res on the that it may 
have been based on need of the full amount for the 
support, care, and education of the who were then 
still minors. 
In Messenger v. 46 Cal.2d 619, 628 [297 P.2d 
988], we held that when "the have clearly expressed 
their 'purpose of fixing and their personal and 
property rights,' have provided that the provision for alimony 
is 'for and in consideration of the permanent and lasting 
division and settlement of all their rights of every 
kind and nature,' and the wife has waived 'all right to future 
maintenance and support . . . , as herein otherwise 
expressly provided,' the conclusion is inescapable that they 
have made the provisions for support and maintenance an 
integral and inseparable of their property settlement 
agreement. With such conclusive evidence of integration, the 
provisions for support and maintenance or alimony would be 
subject to modification only if the parties expressly so pro-
vided." (Accord: Andm·son v. lf!lart, 47 Cal.2d 274, 279 
[303 P.2d 539] .) [1] It is clear from the provisions of the 
agreement quoted above, that the agreement in the present 
case falls squarely within the foregoing rule. The parties 
stated their intention to settle both their property and sup-
port and maintenance rights, and the fact that the amount of 
existing community property was small and the amount that 
might otherwise accrue before the termination of the marriage 
was speculative, in no way detracts from their clearly ex-
pressed intention, as between themselves, to fix and determine 
the amount of the payments thereafter. [2] Similarly, it 
is not significant that the amount agreed upon was the same 
amount defendant had been paying plaintiff following their 
separation bnt before the agreement was exeeuted. In the 
absenee of the agreement, that amount might or might not 
have been aecepted by the court as appropriate for alimony 
and ehild support and it could have been modified in the 
event of ehanged circumstances. The parties were entitled to 
agree to an amount that could not be decreased during the 
minority of the children or increased unless the welfare of 
Mar.1957] HERDA v. HERDA 
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the children so 
36, 43 [265 P.2d 
2cl 619, 627-628 Anderson v. 
281.) 
Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 
v. supra, 46 Cal. 
lYlart, supra, 47 Cal.2d 274, 
[3] The question remains whether the agreement may 
properly be interpreted as providing for payments for plain-
tiff's support following her In Anderson v. Mart, 
supra, 47 Cal.2d 274, 280, we pointed out that in the case 
of integrated agreements executed and incorporated in decrees 
entered before the 1951 amendment to section 139, payments 
pursuant thereto do "not terminate on the death of the 
husband or the remarriage of the wife unless the agreement 
so provided. [Citations.]" (See also Taliaferro v. Talia-
ferr·o, 125 Cal.App.2d 419, 427 [270 P.2d 1036] .) In the 
present case there is no express provision that the payments 
attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate on her 
remarriage. There is also, however, no express provision that 
they should continue until her death. Under these circum-
stances we have concluded that the insignificant amount of 
the community property involved in the agreement justifies 
the conclusion that by necessary implication the payments 
attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate on her 
remarriage just as the payments attributable to the support 
of the children terminate on their reaching their majority. 
In Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 41-42 [265 P.2d 873], 
the court stated that when "the parties have made the pro-
vision for support and maintenanee an integral part of their 
property settlement agreement, the monthly payments will 
ordinarily have a dual character. To the extent that they 
arc designed to discharge the obligation of support and mainte-
nance they will ordinarily reflect the characteristics of that 
obligation and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.) 
On the other hand, to the extent that they represent a 
division of the eommunity property itself, or constitute an 
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settle-
ment, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modi-
fied without changing the terms of the property settlement 
agreement of the parties." It was therefore held in the Dexter 
case that a provision that the payments should terminate on 
the remarriage of the wife did not indicate that the monthly 
payments provided in an integrated agreement were for ali-
mony. [4] It is thus clear that the conclusion that the 
payments should so terminate, based either on an express 
provision to that effect or inferred from the provisions of 
234 HERDA v. HERDA [48 C.2d 
the agreement as a whole, does not conflict with the conclusion 
that it is an integrated bargain and that the payments are 
not otherwise subject to modification. Since the agree-
ment in the present case dealt primarily with support rights 
and the payments were described as for support and mainte-
nance, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the agree-
ment contemplated that the payments should continue for 
plaintiff's benefit after the obligation to support the children 
had terminated (see Anderson v. JJia1·t, supra, 47 Cal.2d 
274, 283, and cases cited) and the obligation of plaintiff's 
support had been assumed by her second husband. Harnden v. 
Harnden, 102 Cal.App.2d 209 [227 P.2d 51], Lane v. Bradley, 
124 Cal.App.2d 661 [268 P.2d 1092], and Taliaferro v. Talia-
ferro, 125 Cal.App.2d 419 [270 P.2d 1036], are not contrary 
to our conclusion herein since in those cases the agreements 
either expressly provided when the payments should terminate 
or involved the settlement of substantial property rights. 
[5] At the time of the previous modification proceedings 
neither child had reached his majority and it cannot be de-
termined from the record whether the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to reduce the payments was based on a 
determination that plaintiff's remarriage was immaterial or 
was based on continuing need of the full amount for the 
support, care, and education of the children. Since the chil-
dren have now reached their majority, the circumstances have 
materially changed since the entry of that order, and plain-
tiff has failed to prove that it was based on a determination 
of the issue now before us. Accordingly, it is not res judicata. 
(Ihtrd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 26 [3 P.2d 545, 76 A.L.R. 1348] ; 
Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, 460 [194 P. 34]; Emer-
son v. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal. 50, 57 [85 P. 122] ; 
Estate of Miller, 104 Cal.App.2d 1, 18 [230 P.2d 667].) 
[6] Paragraph ten of the agreement provides in part that 
defendant agrees to ''pay and indemnify the wife for all 
expenses, costs and attorney's fees in defending any suit, 
motion or proceeding· brought by the husband or anyone in 
his behalf in any manner affecting this Agreement, and the 
wife's right thereto in any respect whatsoever." Since this 
provision does not make plaintiff's right to attorney's fees de-
pendent on her inability to pay them, the trial court erred 
in denying her prayer therefor on the ground that she had 
not shown such inability. 
The order is reversed insofar as it denies plaintiff's motion 
Mar. 1957] HERDA v. HERDA 
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for an award of attorney's fees. In all other respects it is 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Spence, ,T., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTEH, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
judgment of affirmance. I do not, however, agree with the 
majority in its reliance on the cases of Dexter v. Dexter, 42 
Cal.2d 36 [265 P.2d 873], Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Cal.2d 
619 [297 P.2d 988], and Anderson v. JJJart, 47 Cal.2d 274 
[303 P.2d 539]. I express no approval of the law as set forth 
in the above mentioned cases. In the Dexter and Messenger 
cases the court was concerned chiefly with the character of 
the payments provided for in the property settlement agree-
ment and whether or not such payments constituted such an 
integral part of the agreement as to prevent a subsequent 
modification thereof. 
Anderson v. "~[art, supm, has some analogy to the case at 
bar. In that case plaintiff's former husband died. The agree-
ment there contained no provision that the monthly payments 
Rhould cease on plaintiff's remarriage, or the attainment of 
majority by the parties' child, or the death of the payor. In 
the ease at bar, the agreemrnt likewise contained no provision 
for termination of the monthly payments by remarriage of the 
payee, majority of the children, or death of the payor. Both 
the Anderson case and the case at bar involvrd agreements 
rntered into prior to the 1951 amendment of section 139 of 
the Civil Code. The section as it read prior to the amend-
mrnt provided that "Upon the remarriage of the wife, the 
husband shall no longer be obligated to provide for her 
support but such remarriage shall not affect his duty to pro-
vide for the maintenance of the children of his marriage.'' 
The 1951 amendment provided that "Except as otherwise 
agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party 
in any decree, judgment or order for the support and mainte-
nance of the other party shall terminate upon the death of 
the obligor or upon the remarriage of the other party." 
The trial court in the Anderson case held that the payor's 
rstate was indebted to plaintiff (his former wife) on the prop-
erty settlement agreement and that the "agreemrnt was in-
corporated in and made a part of the deeree in the divorce 
action and that the provision for support therein was an 
inseparable part of an integrated property settlement agree-
ment and therefore entered judgm(mt for plaintiff for $14,190 
23() HERDA v. HERDA [48 C.2d 
to be paid out of the funds of the estate m due course of 
administration. That sum was fixed by the court as the pres-
ent value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy." 
(47 Cal.2d 274, 277, 278 [303 P.2d 539].) A majority of 
this court held that the trial court properly allowed plaintiff 
to recover from her former husband's estate "the amount 
attributable to plaintiff's support for the remainder of her 
life expectancy." The conclusion was reached by reasoning 
that the support payments were not separable from the balance 
of the agreement and that the waiver provisions did not pre-
vent plaintiff from enforcing the agreement as made. A ma-
jority also held that the agreement in the Anderson case 
fell ''squarely within the . . . rule'' of the Messenger case. 
In the case at bar, where the majority reach an entirely 
different result, it is also held that the agreement "in the 
present case falls squarely within the . . . rule" of the 
Messenger case. That rule is that when "the parties have 
clearly expressed their 'purpose of fixing and adjusting their 
personal and property rights,' have provided that the pro-
vision for alimony is 'for and in consideration of the perma-
nent and lasting division and settlement of all their prop-
erty rights of every kind and nature,' and the wife has 
waived 'all right to future maintenance and support . . ., 
except as herein otherwise expressly provided,' the con-
clusion is inescapable that they have made the provisions 
for support and maintenance an integral and inseparable 
part of their property settlement agreement. With such 
conclusive evidence of integration, the provisions for support 
and maintenance or alimony would be subject to modifica-
tion only if the parties expressly so provided.'' ( 4() Cal.2d 
619, 628 [297 P.2d 988] .) Despite the fact that the agreement 
here contained no provision of any kind for termination of 
the monthly payments the majority holds that such pay-
ments terminated upon the remarriage of the wife and the 
attainment of majority by the children. It is noted, inter 
alia, in the majority opinion that there was here "no express 
provision that they [the payments] should continue until 
her [plaintiff's 1 death." There was also no such provision 
in the Anderson case agreement. 
The reasoning of the majority in the present case and 
the result reached by it appear to me to be inconsistent. In 
the first instance the Messenger rule is relied upon and it 
is also said that "The parties stated their intention to settle 
both their property and support and maintenance rights, and 
Mar. HERDA v. HE·RDA 
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the fact that the amount of community property was 
small and the amount that might otherwise accrue before the 
termination of the was speculative, in no way 
detracts from their intention, as between 
themselves, to fix and determine the amount of the payments 
thereafter. Similarly, it is not significant that the amount 
agreed upon was the same amount defendant had been 
paying plaintiff following their separation but before the 
was executed. In the absence of the agreement, 
that amount might or might not have been accepted by the 
eourt as appropriate for alimony and child support and it 
t·ould have been modified in the event of changed circum-
stances. 'fhe parties vYere entitled to agree to an amount 
that could not be decreased during the minority of the chil-
dren or iucreased unless the welfare of the children so re-
quired." 'fhe majority, having coneluded that this was an 
integrated, inseparable property settlement agreement, then 
~tated: "The question remains whether the agreement may 
properly be interpreted as providing for payments for plain-
tiff's support following her remarriage. In Anderson v. Mart, 
sttpra, 47 Cal.2d 274, 280, we pointed out that in the case 
of intpgrated agreements executed and incorporated in de-
crees entered before the 1951 amendment to section 139, 
payments pursuant thereto do 'not terminate on the death 
of the husband or the remarriage of the wife unless the agree-
ment so provided. [Citations.]' (See also Taliaferro v. 
Taliaferro, 125 Cal.App.2d 419, 427 [270 P.2d 1036] .) In 
the present case there is no express provision that the pay-
ments attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate on 
her remarriage. There is also, however, no express pro-
vision that they should continue until her death. Under 
these circumstances we have conclttded that the insignificant 
amount of the community prope1·ty 1:nvolvcd in the agreement 
justifies the conclusion that by necessm·y implication the 
pa.yments attr·ibutable to plaintiff's support shmtld terminate 
on her remarriage j?tst as the payments attrib1dable to the 
support of the children terminate on their 1·eaching their ma-
jority." (Emphasis added.) On just what reasoning this 
conclusion is based escapes me. If the monthly payments are 
an integrated part of the property settlement agreement 
and the parties agreed that the wife would receive $250 per 
month without express provision for the termination thereof 
on her remarriage, how can it be concluded that her re-
marriage terminated such payments in view of the reliance 
238 HERDA v. HERDA [48 0.2d 
by the majority on the Anderson case? The code draws 
no distinction betwern rf'marriagc of the wife and the death 
of the payor. 
The majority next quotes from the case of Dexter v. Dexter, 
42 Cal.2d 36, 41, 42 [265 P .2d 873], to the effect that monthly 
payments in a property settlement agreement "will ordi-
narily have a dual character. To the extent that they are 
designed to discharge the obligation of support and mainte-
nance they will ordinarily reflect the characteristics of that 
obligation and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.] 
On the other hand, to the extent that they represent a 
division of the community property itself, or constitute an 
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settle-
ment, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified 
without changing the terms of the property settlement agree-
ment of the parties.'' The majority then notes: ''It was 
therefore held in the Dexter ease that a provision that the 
payments should terminate on the remarriage of the wife did 
not indicate that the monthly payments provided in an 
integrated agreement were for alimony. It is thtts clear that 
the conclnsion that the payments should so terminate, based 
either on an express provision to that effect or inferred ft·orn 
the provisions of the agreement as a whole, docs not conflict 
with the concl1tsion that it is an integrated bargain and that 
the payments are not otherwise subject to modification." 
(Emphasis added.) Then we come to the illogical summa-
tion that ''Since the agreement in the present ease dealt 
primarily with support rights and the payments were de-
scribed as for support and maintenance, it would be unreason-
able to conclude that the agreement contemplated that the 
payments should continue for plaintiff's benefit after the 
obligation to support the children had terminated (see Ander-
son v. Mart, stlpm, 47 Cal.2d 274, 283, and eases cited) and 
the obligation of plaintiff's support had been assumed by her 
second husband"! In the Anderson case the provisions were 
also for support and maintenance, and furthermore, a ma-
jority of this court has heretofore held that the labels adopted 
by the parties are not conclusive and that it is not controlling 
that the monthly payments for support have some of the 
indicia of alimony (Jiesscngct· v. Messenger, 46 Cal.2d 619, 
625, 626 [297 P.2d 988], Dc.Ttcr v. Dexte1·, 42 Cal.2d 36 [265 
P.2d 873], and Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal.2d 49 [265 P.2d 881] ). 
Much has been said by a majority of this court in earlier 
cases about the character of the payments in a property 
Mar. 1957] HERDA 1). HERDA 
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settlement agreement beiug one of fad for the trial court 
in a modifi<·ation proceeding. However a majority has also 
held proper the aeticm of a trial court refnsing the admission 
of evidence on that poill t ( De.TI er v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36 
1265 P.2d 873], and see my ronenrring and dissenting opinion 
1~t pages 44, 45). In the Awlerson ease the trial court de-
termined that the monthly payments >vcre an integrated and 
inseparable part of the property settlement agr<,ement and 
that the obligation for such payments did not terminate 
on the death of the payor since no provision for termination 
had b<•en agre(•<1 to by the parties. A ma;jo1'ity of thir,: eonrt 
affirmed the jndgment ill that respect. Here the trial court 
found that the remarriage of the wife and majority of the 
ehildrr~11 terminated tlw obligation for the monthly payments 
PYen though 110 provision for termination \Yas to he found iu 
the agreement eut0red into by the parties. A majority of 
this eourt affirms the aetiotl of the trial eourt but not on the 
theory that there was sufficient evidence to support the con-
elusion of the trial court on an issne of faet. 'fhe exact 
theory on whieh the majority <~onelnsion is based is not 
stated. It wonld appear from reading the opinion that the 
opposite conclusion was to be reached since it is held that 
the monthly payments were an integrated, inseparable part 
of the property settlement agreement which contained no 
provision for termi!lation on remarriage of the wife or death 
of the payor. It appears to me that the conclusion is in-
escapable that neither Anderson v. Mart nor Messenger v. 
1lf cssenger is in ''accord'' with the holding here as the ma-
jority assnres us they are, but that they are directly contra 
to both the reasoning and conclusion of the majority here. 
'fhe majority seems to have seeedecl from its position that 
the charaetrr of the payments in a property settlement agree-
ment is a question of faet for the trier of fact. It is apparent 
from the majority holdings in the recent cases of Dexter· Y. 
Dexter, 42 Ca1.2c1 :36 [265 P.2d 873], Fo.r. v. Fo.x, 42 Cal.2d 
49 [265 P.2d 881], Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal.2d 55 [265 P.2d 
86;51, Mcsscnurr v. JJfessr:nr;cr, 4G Cal.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988]. 
Ande1·son v. ilfart, 47 Cal.2d 274 [803 P.2rl 5391, and the 
ease at bar that the eharac~ter of the payments for support 
and maintenanee in a property settlement agreement is a 
q1wstion for this court to clr:termine as it sees fit without 
reference to either the determination of the trial court or other 
standard based upon logic or precedent. Until such time 
as a majority of this court sees fit to clarify its position with 
240 HERDA v. HERDA [48 C.2d 
respect to the contractual rights of the and announces 
a standard based upon sound precedent, the statement in my 
concurring and dissenting opinion in the Flynn case that the 
law in this field constitutes an effective trap designed to catch 
both wary and unwary attorneys who are trying honestly and 
conscientiously to their clients' interests is more 
applicable now than it was then. The untold confusion 
existing in the law in this field as the result of the conflicting 
decisions of this court is also a trap for trial and appellate 
judges who are honestly endeavoring to do their duty in decid-
ing cases of this character. This court could, by employing 
a simple process of logic and reason, so clarify the law in these 
cases that lawyers and trial judges would know how to dis-
pose of them properly and thus relieve this court of at least 
a portion of its already tremendous work load. 
I adhere to the views expressed in my concurring and dis-
senting opinions in the Fox, Dexter, Flynn, Messenger and 
Anderson cases, and it is my considered opinion that if and 
when the majority of this court adopts these views the con-
fusion which now exists in this field of law will be obviated 
and the burden now cast upon the courts in disposing of these 
cases will be greatly reduced. 
There may be cases where, in the settlement of property 
rights upon the dissolution of a marriage, that one spouse re-
ceives a larger share of the community property and agrees 
to pay the other cash in lieu thereof. In such a case the 
agreement should provide for the amount to be paid and the 
time of payment. It is obvious that such payments should 
not terminate upon the death of the payor or the remarriage 
of the payee. But in cases such as this and .Anderson v. 
Mart, supra, where it appears that the payments are for sup-
port and maintenance, and no provision is made for their 
termination, they should, as a matter of law, terminate upon 
the death of the payor or the remarriage of the payee. 
The trial court determined here that the provision for 
monthly payments was intended by the parties as support and 
maintenance for the wife and children and that such pay-
ments were intended to terminate upon the remarriage of the 
wife and the attainment of majority by the children. A read-
ing of the record discloses ample evidence to sustain this 
determination and it should, therefore, be affirmed. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in 
the judgment insofar as it affirms the order of the trial court. 
The evidence in this case, as I view it, supports and estab-
Mar.1957] PEOPIJE v. DAVIS 
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legally tenable ground for all essential findings and con-
elusions of the trial court and for that reason I would affirm 
its order in all respe(:ts. Also I would prefer that the majority 
had expressly overruled rather than attempted to distinguish 
v. JJlesscngcr (1956), 46 Ca1.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988], 
alld A11dcrson v. Jlart (1D3G), 47 Ca1.2d 274 [303 P.2d 539], 
in the respects as to which each appears to assert and rely on 
doctrine inconsistent with the holding of the majority today. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
[Ct'im. No. !5881. In Bank. Mar. 29, 1957.] 
THE PiilOP!JE, Hespomlent, v. ,JOHN HACKLEY DAVIS 
et al., Appellants. 
11] Witnesses-Credibility-Disregarding Part of Testimony of 
Witness.-'l'he jury may accept a portion of the testimony 
of a witness and disbelieve the remainder. 
[2] Homicide-Appeal-Review of Evidence-Inherent Improb-
ability.--The testimony of a 16-year-old son of one defendant, 
as a prosecution witness in a first degree murder case, that 
he had been out with defendants on the night in question, 
that defendants had gone into a liquor store about midnight, 
and that after he and his father returned horne he overheard 
his father tell a woman that he and another defendant had 
gone into the store for the purpose of cashing checks, that the 
clerk "didn't go for it" and they decided to rob him, and that 
the other defendant then pulled a gun and shot the clerk in 
the month was not inherently improbable and it was for the 
jury to determine its weight, but in view of the facts that 
sueh tllstimony was conflicting with that of other witnesses, 
and that the witness expressed a desire to change his testimony 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, § 296; [2] Homicide, 
§ 249; [3] SParches and Seizures, § 1; [ 4, 6] Criminal Law, § 453; 
Criminal Law, §§ 453, 457; [7] Criminal Law, § 453(1); [8] 
Criminal Law,§ 4!53(1), 4:33(6); [9] Witnesses,§ 253; [10] Homi-
eide, § 185; [11] Homicide, § 195; [12] Criminal Law, § 821; [13] 
Crimina] Law, § 456: [14] Homiride, § 175; [15] Homicide, ~ 188; 
[16] Homicide, § 2:36; Criminal Law, § 632; [17] Criminal Law, 
~ 23"'1Jl): [181 Criminal Law, § 613; [19] Criminal Law, § 202; 
[20] Attorneys, § 61; [21] Attorneys, § 27; [22] Criminal Law, 
~§637, 6:18(1); [23] Criminal Law, §fi89; [24] Criminal Law, 
§ 617; [25] Criminal Law,§ 1404(12). 
